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THE OBJECTIVE AND FUNCTION OF THE COMPLAINT
COMMON LAW-CODES-FEDERAL RULES
FLEMING JAMES, JR.*
Before a court can properly decide a case and enter judgment, cer-
tain things must have taken place. The court must have obtained
jurisdiction over the parties and over the controversy to be decided.'
Limits must be set to the controversy so that the court and the parties
may know how to direct their efforts, and so that the court may rule
on questions of relevancy. The issues of fact and of law must be
framed so that each is allocated to the appropriate tribunal for
decision and is presented clearly enough so that the tribunal knows
what to decide. The adversary must be given fair notice of the case
alleged against him so that he will be able to prepare his own case to
try to meet it. There must be some appropriate time and place set
apart for allowing the parties to present their evidence or their argu-
ments to the tribunal. The basis for the judgment should be so laid
that parties may determine its scope whenever it becomes important,
either for enforcing the judgment itself or in some later proceeding.
The obtention of jurisdiction must probably precede a valid judg-
ment;2 beyond that there is no ironclad time sequence for these steps.
Judgment may even precede trial or hearing, provided the one cast
in judgment is given reasonable opportunity to present his case upon
attacking the judgment after it is entered.3 But of course trial or
hearing nearly always comes before judgment. Moreover it is cer-
tainly desirable from the point of view of convenience and administra-
tive efficiency to have as many of the other steps taken before trial as
possible. Otherwise the trial itself must be interrupted while issues
are framed and the controversy limited or while the adversary is
given opportunity to meet contentions of which he had no notice.
*Professor of Law, Yale Law School; co-author, Harper & James, Law of
Torts (1956).
The author wishes to acknowledge the able assistance of Stephen L. Dinces,
third year student at the Yale Law School.
1. See, e.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877).
Recent developments in this field may be suggested by Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Henry L. Doherty
& Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
2. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915); but
cf. York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
3. Baldwin v. American Sur. Co., 287 U.S. 156 (1932). Cf. Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945). This was an eminent domain proceeding under
the War Purposes Act of 1917; "judgment" vesting title in the United States
was entered prior to hearing of trial pursuant to the Declaration of Taking
Act of 1931. A judgment so rendered is not a final judgment.
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Traditionally, at common law, principal reliance was placed upon
pleadings-the written statements by the parties of their claims and
defenses-to do most of these jobs.4 Indeed this was nearly the only
device which common law courts afforded for the pretrial discovery
of adversary claims or of evidence in an adversary's possession.5
Courts of Chancery did, to be sure, devise machinery for interrogating
an adversary, for obtaining disclosure of documents and things in his
possession, and for taking depositions, all before trial.6 And this ma-
chinery for what may be called discovery became available in aid of
an action or defense at law under some circumstances.7 But the
availability of such pretrial discovery was limited by important con-
ditions so that by and large the common law did look only to pleadings
to get a case ready for trial and to protect the adversary's rights in
preparing for trial.8
In recent years there has been a very great development and expan-
sion in the use of discovery and other pretrial devices.9 This means
that the steps which it is desirable to have taken before trial need no
longer be done solely by pleadings, if they are to be done at all. We
must bear this in mind in the following discussion of the function of
the pleadings for we may well find that there are other better ways
to take many pretrial steps; this in turn may well lead to a de-emphasis
of pleading itself.
Before proceeding to a more detailed examination of the functions
listed above, one thing further should be noted. The listing contains
a good deal of overlap and duplication. The vesting in a court, for
example, of jurisdiction over a particular controversy necessarily
involves some definition of that controversy-that is the setting of
limits to it. The framing of specific issues to be tried is one way to
limit the controversy. Both the framing of issues and the setting of
bounds to the controversy give some kind of notice to the court and
adversary of what is to be the subject of trial and-for the adversary
-what must be prepared against and met. These functions have been
listed separately because each emphasizes a different purpose and
each has been selected, at one time or another, by some school of
thought, as particularly deserving of emphasis.
4. See generally STEPHEN, TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING ch. II
(1824) [hereinafter cited as STEPHEN]. The original edition of STEPHEN is cited
(except as otherwise noted) since this was a contemporaneous reflection of
the common law even before the Hilary Rules.
5. See MILLA, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 219 (1952) [hereinafter cited as MILLAR].
6. MILLAR 201.
7. MILLAR 204.
8. MILLAR 36, 37, 204. See also James, Discovery, 38 YALE L.J. 746 (1929);
RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932), on the general subject.
9. On the historical development of discovery, see MILLAR ch. XIV.
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In what follows we shall first briefly examine the principal aims
which pleadings have sought to achieve from time to time in Anglo-
American law and trace the history of their emphasis. In the second
part we shall examine how the notice-giving function of the plaintiff's
complaint was served at common law and in equity, and how it is
served under more modern procedures.
I. THE Anis OF PLEADINGS
Vesting the court with jurisdiction over the particular subject mat-
ter of an individual case.-Courts are created and vested with jurisdic-
tion by constitutional or statutory provision. Such provision defines
the subject matters of the jurisdiction in general terms; it does not
give the court jurisdiction over a specific case. Nor do courts possess
general roving jurisdiction to bring matters of a civil nature before
themselves.' 0 Under our system it is left to the parties to bring
specific cases within the jurisdiction of the court. In most cases the
pleadings are relied upon to vest the court with jurisdiction over the
particular subject matter of an individual case. The general notion is
that a court has no jurisdiction to decide matters which the parties
have not presented to it by their pleadings, although there may also
be other ways for the parties to put a matter before the court; ques-
tions may arise whether these alternatives confer jurisdiction upon
the court."
The setting of bounds to a controversy.-This is important primarily
to serve what may be called the secondary objectives of procedure.
Some definition of the controversy is needed to give the adversary
fair notice and an opportunity to defend. It is needed also for admin-
istrative efficiency and to make clear, for those who have later occa-
sion to look, just what has been adjudicated.'2
10. Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945).
11. The court was held to lack jurisdiction over issues not presented by
proper pleadings in Rhodes v. Sewell, 21 Ala. App. 441, 109 So. 179 (1926).
See also New Haven Sand Blast Co. v. Dreisbach, 104 Conn. 322, 133 Atl. 99
(1926); Munday v. Vail, 34 N.J.L. 418 (1871).
Compare, however, Vider v. City of Chicago, 60 Ill. App. 595 (1895); Gwin
v. Williams, 27 Miss. 324 (1854); Leach v. Western N.C. R.R., 65 N.C. 486
(1871).
12. It is submitted that the primary objective of all procedure should be to
secure to parties the full measure of their substantive rights (or impose
upon them their duties under substantive law). In a finite world under
any system administered by fallible human beings, however, the unfettered
pursuit of ultimate truth in every dispute is practically out of the question.
There is the need to put limits on inquiry, and the existence of these limits
in turn calls for safeguards so that the inquiry shall give each party concerned
a sense that he is being fairly dealt with. Under our adversary system this
means not only determination by an impartial and not too inconvenient
tribunal, but also a reasonable chance for each party to present his side of
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The production of an issue.-Different systems have stressed different
aspects of this general objective. The common law laid particular
emphasis on the production of an issue and relied entirely on plead-
ings to achieve this purpose.13 To each pleading, therefore, the adver-
sary had either to demur or to plead until a single issue of law or of
fact was framed.14 A demurrer raised an issue of law upon the
sufficiency of the pleading demurred to. A denial, or traverse, of the
material allegations in the next prior pleading raised an issue of fact;
but if the adversary confessed those allegations and set up other facts
(new matter) to avoid their legal effect, further pleading was called
for. A pleader might not both demur and plead, or both deny and
avoid; and avoidances had to be single.'5
One reason for this, in early times, was that the nature of the
trial or hearing depended upon the nature of the issue which there-
fore had to be framed before the trial took place.
As questions of law were decided by the court, and matter of fact
referred to other kind of investigation, it was, in the first place, necessary
to settle whether the question in the cause, or issue, was a matter of law
or fact. Again, if it happened to be a matter of fact, it required to be
developed in a form sufficiently specific to show what was the method
of trial appropriate to the case.'6
Early forms of trial included: trial by jury, by ordeal, by battle, and
by wager of law. Even in Stephen's day the following could be listed,
though all of them save jury trial were very rare: trial by jury, "by
the grand assize-by the record-by certificate-by witnesses-by
inspection-and by wager of aw."'7
Under such a system administrative efficiency would clearly be
served by the production before trial of a single issue; indeed the
production of issue is well nigh a necessity, and a requirement that
it be single-while not strictly necessary-is of the highest conven-
ience.18
As time wore on the common law courts came to try virtually all
the case before the tribunal. The objectives sought by these safeguards, and
the aim of administrative efficiency are here called secondary, not to disparage
them, but to emphasize the paramount importance of what is called the pri-
mary objective. Those who drafted the original code made a similar value
judgment. See STATE OF NEw YORK, FIRST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS, ON
PRACTICs AND PLEADING 67-87 (particularly 74, 75), 137-47 (1848) [hereinafter
cited as FIRST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS].
13. STEPHEN 145, 155.
14. STEPHEN 157.
15. STEPHEN 157, 170, 219-32, 290, 296. In Stephen's day multiple pleas were
allowed. Id. at 290.
16. STEPHEN 148.
17. STEPHEN 102. For a description of earlier forms, see, e.g., MAITLAND, THE
FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 14-18 (1936).
18. See MnLnAR 33.
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issues of fact to a jury. However, the traditional ideal of the single
issue persisted and came to be justified in part by the notion that a
lay tribunal without special skill should have the controversy thus
simplified for them lest the matter get beyond the depth of their
competence. 19
Such was the picture drawn by theory. But the insistence that
decision turn on a single issue, while it produced administrative effi-
ciency with a vengeance, too often did so at the expense of substantive
justice. It has been a perennial characteristic of dispute-settling
processes that no one can forecast with certainty what the proof will
bring forth in the way of facts, or of issues, or of the possible attitude
towards facts and law that the tribunal may take, even where the
merits of a controversy finally do turn on a single issue which origi-
nally seemed to be crucial. Moreover, numerous controversies present
two or more issues-sometimes many-which must all be resolved if
full justice is to be done. Any system, therefore, which compels
litigants to stake the outcome of litigation on the accuracy of a fore-
cast that its merits will properly turn on the resolution of a single
issue specifically designated in advance, will be bound to cause many
a miscarriage of justice. The common law did not ignore the hardship
thus produced; but neither did it altogether abandon the ideal of
the single issue. Courts and legislatures in fact attempted to ameliorate
the hardship by a series of halfway measures, compromises, and
fictions that yielded a system which lacked both the stark simplicity
of the older dispensation, and the elasticity needed for the unfettered
pursuit of justice.20 The practice of inserting multiple counts in a
declaration started with cases wherein multiple wrongs of the same
nature had been done the plaintiff, but was extended to cover multiple
statements of the same wrong.21 In this way a plaintiff could have the
advantage of more than one version of a single occurrence.22 Multiple
defenses were allowed by statute.23 Permission for multiple replica-
tions followed,2 and so on. The result was graphically described by
the First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings:
Suppose then, what frequently happens, that a declaration contains five
counts, that there are three pleas to each count, with but a single replica-
19. Cf. MILLAR 133.
20. FIRST REPORT OF COVMISSmONERS 140.
21. See SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 201 (3d ed. Ballantine 1923)
[hereinafter cited as SHIPMA4.N]. See also CLARK, CODE PLEADING 132 n.152 (2d
ed. 1947).
22. The practice is described in a report made by the English Common Law
Commissioners as set out in the appendix to the second American edition
Of STEPHEN. STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL AcTIONS, app. at CX
passim (2d Am. ed. 1831).
23. 4 Ann c. 16, § 4 (1706). See FIRST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS 140.
24. FIRST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS, 140.
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tion to each plea. Here are fifteen issues: and if there be two replications
to each plea, there will be thirty .... Indeed, the effect of the system has
been to raise up issues upon verbal distinctions, and thus far increase
rather than diminish the number of questions.2
The ideal of singleness-and with it, administrative efficiency-was
thus abandoned in fact. But the insistence upon the production of
issues remained as long as did common law pleading.
Later developments.-The objective of framing issues before trial has
not been altogether abandoned in later American procedural systems
but the emphasis has shifted. While pleadings still often frame issues
there is no insistence that they do so in all cases. Thus, if an answer
admits the allegations of a complaint but sets up matter in avoidance
no issue is framed until there is either a denial or a statement of
further new matter which is in turn denied. Yet the federal rules and
many states provide for no pleadings beyond the answer in such a
case.26 Further, other pretrial devices are often relied on to frame
issues, notably the pretrial hearing.
In place of issue framing, the early codes gave first importance to
the notice-giving function of pleading, and this emphasis has largely
persisted to the present day. Among those who would stress the
notice-giving function, however, two different viewpoints have devel-
oped. One would look to the pleadings to afford the adversary fairly
detailed notice of the facts to be presented against him.2 The other
would have the pleadings give only a more general notice of the
pleader's claim or defense, and would rely on other pretrial discovery
devices for fuller development of the facts.2 8 There are, of course, all
degrees of detail or generality, and there is no bright line to separate
these viewpoints. Differences have, however, been recognizable
enough. At one extreme stand those who favor what is sometimes
called "notice pleading," under which the pleadings do no more than
identify the transaction or occurrence out of which the claim or
claims arise.2 5 There is no strong support today for going that far
in the ordinary run of cases, but the most recent large-scale move-
ment, which culminated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
a number of state counterparts, was in the direction of greater gen-
erality and less detail in pleading than is required by some state courts
25. Id. at 143.
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7; MLrLAfl 171.
27. See, e.g., Fee, The Lost Horizon in Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 48 COLUm. L. REv. 491 (1948); McCaskill, Actions & Causes
of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614, 641 (1935). See also Claim or Cause of Action,
13 F.R.D. 253 (1952).
28. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456 (1943); CLARI, CODE PLEADING
57 (2d ed. 1947). See also Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discov-
ery Procedure, 38 CoLum. L. REV. 1179 (1938).
29. Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 HARV. L. REv. 501 (1918).
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under their codes.30
Detailed pleading does, of course, tend to define the controversy
more narrowly and give fuller notice to the adversary than does more
general pleading. It ties the pleader down to specifics. By the same
token, however, it multiplies the danger that substantive justice will
be avoided because of the fact, noted above, that it is often impossible
to forecast with accuracy the course of proof at the trial or how the
tribunal will view it. Proponents of general pleading are therefore
content with fairly broad notice and fairly broad scope for the con-
troversy at the pleading stage but would insist upon providing for a
thorough mutual pretrial disclosure of the facts themselves (as dis-
tinguished from claims of fact) .31
II. THE COmPLAIn
The common law declaration.-Under the formulary system the
plaintiff's first pleading had to be one which was appropriate to the
form of action he had chosen.3 Each form of action had its own
earmarks, quite familiar to the profession, so that in most cases the
defendant could tell from the declaration-and indeed from the
original writ if there was one-just what the form of action was.
Since each form of action had its own peculiar train of legal conse-
quences, this was important information. Thus a defendant could
know from the very first pleading what theory of substantive law
might be urged against him. Substantive law grew up separately for
each form of action. There were no general theories of liability. If a
defendant was proceeded against in trespass, he knew that only those
legal rules which governed liability in trespass could successfully be
urged against him; the question, in other words, would be not whether
defendant was liable under the law of the land but only whether he
was so under the law of trespass. If not, plaintiff could not succeed
30. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERIcAN SYSTEM
or LITIGATION (1956) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN]; CLARK, CODE PLEADING
241, 242 (2d ed. 1947). See also Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-
Discovery Procedure, 38 COLUm. L. REV. 1179 (1938). On the historical devel-
opment of the Federal Rules, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING 31-39 (2d ed. 1947);
1 MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 0.521-0.528 (2d ed. 1960).
31. Compare 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 33.17, 33.29 (2d ed. 1950) with
James, Revival of Bills of Particulars Under the Federal Rules, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 1473 (1958).
32. This choice was usually made before any pleading. Each form of action
had its own peculiar form of original writ. At early common law, actions were
usually begun by obtaining such an original writ from the Chancery. By the
nineteenth century, however, alternative ways of commencing actions (e.g.,
by writs of process, or by bill) had become prevalent. STEPHEN 24-28, 51-60.
And ejectment commenced not by writ or bill, but by delivering to the tenant
in possession of the premises, a declaration framed as against a fictitious de-
fendant. Id. at 45.
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even though the facts showed clearly that he was entitled to recover
in some other form of action.
Moreover each form of action had its own peculiar procedural inci-
dents. The form of action determined, for example: the competency
of the court; the form of process available to make defendant appear
(whether, for instance, there could be a body attachment); the
appropriate steps in case of default; the mode of trial (whether by
jury or by some older method such as wager of law, ordeal, and so
on); the proper form of plea; the form of judgment and of execution
(whether plaintiff could be put in possession of the subject of dispute,
whether defendant could be imprisoned or made an outlaw, and so
on) . 3
The initial stage in a common law action (including the declara-
tion) did, then, give defendant fairly detailed and precise notice of the
legal theory and the procedural incidents with which he would be
confronted. Of course there were areas of doubt. There was not
always a clear line separating the forms of action. There was some
confusion, overlap and growth?1 Yet, by and large, a competent
lawyer could tell the defendant how he stood in these respects. But
how much did a common law declaration tell the defendant about the
facts which the plaintiff would rely on at trial?
The answer to this question is not simple. Early common law
pleading was oral. "The litigants stood opposite each other at the bar
of the court, and the plaintiff stated his case by his own mouth or
that of the pleader."35 There followed something of an altercation
between the parties and the court. What was initially said on this
occasion was apparently not final; it could be amended or even aban-
doned as the discussion progressed.3 Finally, however, the parties
had to take a stand and their statements were noted on the roll of the
court. Thus the issue in the case came to be fixed by a process which
Morgan has likened to the modern pretrial hearing.37 What emerged
was often a simple and direct statement of fact.3
The first written pleadings tended to follow the short and pithy
forms of the only existing precedents;9 and indeed the common law
33. See MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 17, at 2-4.
34. See, e.g., FIELD & KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVL PRO-
cEDURE 225-36 (1953).
35. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING 60 (1897)
[hereinafter cited as HEPBURN]; MORGAN 9-11; STEPHEN 28-32.
36. Ibid. See, e.g., Watkins Case, Y.B. 3 Hy. 6, f. 36b, pl. 33 (1425), as re-
ported in FxELD & KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
245 (1953); Latimer v. Walton, Y.B. 1 & 2 Edw. 2, S.S. 165 (1308-1309), as
reported in CLARx, CASES ON PLEADING & PROCEDURE 32 (2d ed. 1940).
37. MORGAN 28, 34.
38. Watkins Case, note 36 supra; HEPBURN 62.
39. HEPBURN 61.
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never abandoned the theory that pleadings should "have only occasion
to state facts"4° and that these should be stated simply and truly.
Moreover there continued to be, throughout the history of common
law pleading, instances where the theory represented the fact. Thus
the declaration in an action on the case for damages caused by negli-
gent driving of a vehicle was in the nineteenth century still a simple
and accurate description of events.
In many other situations, however, the original theory came to be
belied by the facts. For one thing some forms of action developed
and expanded through fictions, and many of these fictions were recited
in the declaration. In general assumpsit, although the- obligation was
imposed by law, the defendant was always said to have undertaken
the obligation by a promise.41 In trover the plaintiff was said to have
casually lost and the defendant to have found the articles which
defendant was charged with converting,42 although the action would
lie when there was neither losing nor finding.43 In ejectment "the
declaration and accompanying proceedings were a mass of fictions
which had become ridiculous";44 not even the parties plaintiff or
defendant were real persons.
In other situations the greatest particularity was required and the
slightest deviation from the details alleged was fatal.45
In still other situations the greatest generality and vagueness were
allowed. If a plaintiff pleaded a simple capsule formula of liability
he might recover even though he proved quite different facts, so long
as they had the same legal effect as the stereotyped facts within the
formula. This was very much the case in general assumpsit. A
plaintiff who declared that defendant had and received money to the
plaintiff's use, and promised to pay the same to him, might prove
under that declaration that defendant had stolen or converted plain-
tiff's goods and sold them; that defendant had fraudulently induced
plaintiff to buy some worthless article and that plaintiff had thereafter
rescinded the sale; that plaintiff had himself paid or overpaid money
to defendant by mistake (as where one mistakenly pays a bill twice);
and so on.4 Of course plaintiff might show the very facts suggested
40. HEPBURN 63.
41. SHnMA 254, 258.
42. SHIPMAN 230.
43. Sn'PxAN 98.
44. POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY CIVIL ACTION ACCORDING TO
THE REFORMED Arvm UcAN PROCEDURE 539 (1876) [hereinafter cited as POME-
ROY]. The original edition of POMEROY is cited throughout since this was
nearest in time to the original adoption of the codes.
45. See Wabash W. Ry. v. Friedman, 146 Ill. 583, 30 N.E. 353 (1892); Span-
gler v. Pugh, 21 Ill. 85 (1859). The report cited supra note 22, contains ref-
erences to other harsh decisions.
46. See FIRST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS 70-71, 145.
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by the declaration-that money was entrusted to defendant on his
.undertaking to turn it over to plaintiff-but this does not seem to
have been the usual case.
General assumpsit afforded the extreme example of permissible
.vagueness but there were others. Thus in Scott v. Shepherd,47 an
action brought in trespass, the declaration alleged in effect that
defendant threw a squib at plaintiff and hit him in the face with it.
The proof revealed an entirely different situation, namely that the
squib was thrown by defendant in a market place and landed near
the stall of Yates; that it was picked up and thrown again by Willis,
a bystander; that it then landed near the stall of Ryall and was thrown
still a third time by Ryall, this time finally hitting plaintiff in the
face. Although the action was strenuously and ably contested for
defendant, no point of variance was urged. Presumably if the facts
shown by the evidence afforded a remedy in trespass (which was the
chief bone of contention) then they might properly be shown under
the simple formula.
To sum up, the common law declaration did give a defendant fairly
accurate notice of the substantive legal theory and the procedural
incidents which might be used against him; it sometimes gave him
such notice of the facts which might be shown at trial. On the score
of facts, however, the opposite was true in many situations; there was
often little or no correspondence between the facts alleged and those
which appeared on trial. From the plaintiff's point of view, common
law pleading tied him down narrowly to a single legal theory and
sometimes, with Procrustean rigidity, to the facts alleged. In other
situations it gave him very great latitude in matter of fact.
The bill of complaint in equity had become cumbersome and prolix
by the nineteenth century. Typically it consisted in three parts: the
narrative, the charging, and the interrogative parts.&4 Only the first
of these, which contained a statement of the complainant's case for
relief, was strictly necessary.49 The charging part contained a fairly
detailed statement of evidence which anticipated and rebutted
defendant's supposed positions. The last part propounded interroga-
tories calculated to extract admissions and discover evidence from
the adversary who had to respond to proper interrogatories under
oath. All this involved a good deal of repetition and detail. It did
not, however, involve the fictions so prevalent in common law plead-
ing. Nor did it involve to nearly the same degree the pleading of
facts according to their legal effect when that legal effect would not
47. 2 W. Black. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525; 3 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (C.P.
1773).
48. PoivmRoy § 507 at 535. See also SHIPMAN 11.
49. Ibid.
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be aptly described by the languages used.50
It was to equity pleading that those who drafted the New York
Code turned for their model. In their First Report, the Commissioners
on Practice and Pleadings found that the chancery practice,
however disfigured in some places by unnecessary forms-however dis-
figured at this day by extreme prolixity-was nevertheless, in its own
nature, flexible, highly convenient, and capable of being made to answer
all the ends of justice. There was literally no form about it. The party
stated his case and asked the relief he desired; and the court, if he proved
his case, gave him that relief. Under this practice any suit for any kind
of a remedy may be brought.5'
The Code Complaint.-The framers of the original codes sought to do
away with the rigidity and resulting injustice which had been pro-
duced by the formulary system of the common law and by the dis-
tinction between law and equity.52 This was central to the whole
system they proposed. They sought to set up instead a system wherein
a plaintiff would state the facts of his grievance in simple, nontechni-
cal language and the court would be free to administer whatever
substantive law it found applicable to those facts without regard to
any distinctions between the forms of action or between law and
equity.53 No new rights and remedies were meant to be created, and
the substantive law still had to be drawn from existing precedents.M
But the inquiry now was to be whether the facts warranted relief on
the basis of any of those precedents-not simply on the basis of those
associated with a single form of action. The whole law of the land
was made available to the court in deciding each case.5 The drafters
50. POMEROY § 507 at 537.
51. FIRST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS 71.
52. FIRST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS 67-87. This title of the report starts
out with these words: "The chief object of this title is to declare the leading
principles which lie at the foundation of the whole proposed system of
legal procedure, and without which, in our judgment, very few, if any
essential reforms can be effected in remedial law. We refer to the abolition
of the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and of the forms
of such actions and suits." Id. at 67-68. See also CLARK, CODE PLEADING §§
7, 15 (2d ed. 1947); POMEROY §§ 28, 67.
53. Rogers v. Duhart, 97 Cal. 500, 32 Pac. 570 (1893); White v. Lyons, 42
Cal. 279 (1871); Knapp v. Walker, 73 Conn. 459, 47 Atl. 655 (1900); Metropolis
Mfg. Co. v. Lynch, 68 Conn. 459, 36 Atl. 832 (1896); Wright v. Wright, 54 N.Y.
437 (1873); Emery v. Pease, 20 N.Y. 62 (1859); POMEROY §§ 70-71. Compare
Clissold v. Cratchley [1910] 2 K.B. 244 (C.A.).
54. FIRST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS 146, 147. ["No rule of law, by which
rights and wrongs are measured, will be touched, the object and effeft of
the change being only the removal of old obstructions, in the way of enforcing
the rights, and redressing the wrongs."] POMEROY §§ 37, 68; sources cited
supra note 53.
55. Sources cited supra note 53. Crary v. Goodman, 12 N.Y. 266 (1855).
"[S]ince the enactment of the Code ... the question ... is not whether the
plaintiff has a legal right or an equitable right, or the defendant a legal or
equitable defence against the plaintiff's claims; but whether, according to
the whole law of the land, applicable to the case, the plaintiff makes out the
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of the codes also sought to do away with the fictions and technicalities
of common law pleading.5
These new objectives, it will be seen, involved a shift-almost a
reversal-of view of the function of the pleadings. The plaintiff was
now required in his complaint to give accurate notice of the facts in
all cases, but he was relieved of the requirement that he tie himself
down to the single legal theory embodied in a form of action. Fact
certainty and notice were substituted for certainty and notice of legal
theory and legal procedural consequences.
These basic objectives are still today widely recognized as valid
guides for determining the functions of modern pleading. 7 But the
course of developments under the codes was by no means clear and
uniform. Simple notions became encrusted with gloss, so that they
were beyond recognition in some jurisdictions. Sound objectives
became confused and were even lost sight of. There was need for
much rethinking and revamping when new rules for the federal courts
were to be drafted in the 1930's.
One unfortunate development under the early codes was the emer-
gence of the theory of the pleadings doctrine. Under this abortive
doctrine the court had to "decide with certainty what the specific
cause of action counted and relied upon [in a complaint] is,"58 and
then to confine plaintiff to recovery under that theory. Thus on
demurrer the court would test the sufficiency of the allegations in the
light of the legal theory which it found embodied in the complaint.
And if the allegations did not support recovery under that particular
legal theory, the demurrer would be sustained even though the alle-
gations were sufficient to support recovery under a different legal
theory.59 The complaint had to embrace a single legal theory and
stick to it. It might not be "uncertain and ambulatory . . . now
presenting one face to the court and now another, at the mere will of
the pleader, so that it may be regarded as one in tort, or one in con-
tract, or in equity as he is pleased to name it and the necessities of
argument require, and if discovered to be good in any of the turns
of phases which it may thus be made to assume, that it must be
right which he seeks to establish, or the defendant shows that the plaintiff
ought not to have the relief sought for." Id. at 268.
56. See FrST REPORT OF COMMIssIONERs 70, 145; POMEROY §§ 510, 529.
57. Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CEN-
TENARY EssAYs 55 (1949); CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 15, at 4 (2d ed. 1947);
2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1111 8.12-8.14, at 1641, 1653-58 (2d ed. 1960).
58. Supervisors of Kewaunee County v. Decker, 30 Wis. 624, 633 (1872).
59. O6litic Stone Co. v. Ridge, 169 Ind. 639, 83 N.E. 246 (1908); Magwire v.
Tyler, 47 Mo. 115 (1870); Supervisors of Kewaunee County v. Decker, supra
note 58. See Albertsworth, The Theory of the Pleadings in Code States, 10
CALIF. L. REV. 202 (1922); Page, Application of the Derogation Rule to the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1955 WIs. L. REV. 91; Whittier, The Theory of a
Pleading, 8 COLum. L. REv. 523 (1908).
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upheld in that aspect, as a proper and sufficient pleading by the
court."
60
Such rulings in effect perpetuated much of the essence of the formu-
lary system, and much of its rigidity. The form of action simply
became transformed into the theory of the action; the code term
"cause of action" was interpreted as meaning legal theory of the action
and equated to. the ancient forms.6 1 "[T]he inherent and essential
differences and peculiar properties of actions have not been destroyed,
and from their very nature cannot be."6'
It is hard to imagine a concept which would fly more directly in the
face of what the codes were trying to do. The codes expressly abol-
ished the distinctions between the forms of action, and its proponents
had explained at length how they sought to escape from the evils of a
system which compelled a suitor to choose a single legal theory and
stand or fall on it, without regard to the meritorious question whether
plaintiff's cause is a just one under the law of the land.6 3
The theory of the pleadings doctrine probably represented for the
most part nostalgia for the older system. It was increasingly aban-
doned with the passing of the generation which was steeped in the
ancient learning.P In modern context the only rational basis for
defending any such notion is a belief that the defendant should have
accurate advance notice of the legal theories5 as well as of the facts
which plaintiff intends to rely upon. The prevailing view under the
codes denies this and chooses to protect a party's substantive right
to recover upon any legal theory properly found applicable to the
facts pleaded and proved, rather than to protect his adversary against
a possible (but often fanciful) surprise from the invocation of an
unexpected legal theory.6 6 While there are dissenting voices,67 the
prevailing view seems sound and was embodied in the federal rules.
Most commentators hailed the merger of law and equity and of
the forms of action as the great accomplishments of the codes.68 To a
certain extent these things were tied in with the notion of fact plead-
60. Supervisors of Kewaunee County v. Decker, supra note 58, at 629.
61. For different renditions of the term "cause of actions," see Clark, The
Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817 (1924); PorvmRoY §§ 452-57, 518-25.
62. Supervisors of Kewaunee County v. Decker, supra note 58, at 629.
63. FIRST REPORT OF Coml ssioNmis 67-88, 137-47.
64. PomERoy §§ 66-67, 72. Compare the Missouri and Wisconsin cases cited
supra note 59 with Bragg v. Specialty Shoe Mach. Co., 225 Mo. App. 902, 34
S.W.2d 184 (1931); Bieri v. Fonger, 139 Wis. 150, 120 N.W. 862 (1909).
65. The modern view would not confine plaintiff to a single legal theory as.
the theory of the pleadings doctrine did.
66. See James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars Under the Federal Rules,,
71 HAlv. L. REV. 1473, 1481-85 (1958).
67. MU LAR, 194-200. Cf. Cleary, The Uses of Pleading, 40 Ky. L.J. 46 (1952).
68. See, e.g., CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 15, at 78 (2d ed. 1947); POAMWoY
§§ 28, 34.
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ing; as we have seen, they meant the abandonment of the formulary
system which stressed the pleading of stereotyped formulas of legal
liability, and the substitution for it of pleading facts to which the
courts were free to apply any applicable substantive law. But the
code ideal of fact pleading involved another aspect of more doubtful
value. It came to be associated, especially in some jurisdictions, with
a requirement of detail or particularity in pleading which has often
proved a stumbling block to suitors in their quest for substantive
justice.69 In order to escape from the fictions and the vague, mislead-
ing legal formulas of common law pleading, and to provide for all
cases what was thought to be best in equity pleading, the Code
required the complaint in all civil actions to contain: "A statement
of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise lan-
guage, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person
of common understanding to know what is intended"; and a demand
for relief.7
0
The word "facts" in this context is commonly distinguished from
"evidence" on the one hand, and "law" on the other. Facts are to be
pleaded; law and evidence are not.
7 '
This was by no means an altogether new requirement. In one sense
"'law" has never been properly pleaded, either at common law or
under the codes. The concept was familiar enough that the office of
'a declaration was to furnish the minor premise in a syllogism. The
rule of law invoked was the major premise, but that was judicially
known to the court and need not be stated. The declaration stated
'the facts in this particular case and thereby brought it under the
appropriate rule of law. The conclusion was the judgment of the
court. The classic example 2 was this:
Major premise: Against him who hath ridden over my corn, I shall
have damages.
Minor premise: But A hath ridden over my corn.
Conclusion: Wherefore I shall have damages against A.
The codes did not, and were not intended to, change this concept.
The strictures against pleading "law" found among judicial deci-
sions and commentators on code pleading were not directed against
pleading "law" in the sense just described-although it continued to
be improper to plead a rule of law-but what was meant rather was
a prohibition against pleading facts according to their legal effect, or
69. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 38 (2d ed. 1947). See also notes 98, 99 infra;
2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 8.12 (2d ed. 1960),
70. FIRST REPORT OF. COM1 UsSIONES § 120 (2).
71. CLARKC, CODETPIiAbNG.§ 38, at 225-30 (2d. ed. 1947); POMEROY §§ 530, 532.
72. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *396.
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pleading "conclusions of law." Thus in a famous passage Pomeroy
stated: "Every attempt to combine fact and law, to give the facts a
legal coloring and aspect, to present them in a legal bearing upon
the issues rather in their actual naked simplicity, is so far forth an
averment of law instead of fact, and is a direct violation of the
principle upon which the codes have constructed their system of
pleading."73 He then gives examples from common law pleading of
offenses against this principle but states that the declaration in a
special action on the case "was framed in substantial conformity with
the reformed theory." Under the codes in all cases, "the allegations
must be of dry, naked, actual facts." 4
This passage is ambiguous. If the first sentence is to be taken
literally it lays down a rule which is virtually impossible of fulfill-
ment. Moreover, no good purpose would be served by trying to
fulfill it. The total number of facts which go to make up even a
simple occurrence or transaction is well-nigh infinite. Consider all
that goes into the signing of a man's name; what myriad facts are
represented by the words "fountain pen," for instance. We neither
think nor speak in terms of all these facts unless there is particular
occasion for it. We select and combine them for. the purpose at hand.
And we use concepts and words which involve selection and combina-
tion along functional lines. In the case of the signature, for instance,
if the fact of signing alone was important we would say: "He signed
the document." If we were concerned with determining whether the
signer was right-handed, we would say: "He signed it with his left
[or right] hand." If the medium mattered, we would say: "He signed
it in ink." If we were interested in advertising we would say: "The
President signed the - treaty with a Writewell fountain pen."
When we are involved in litigation we are concerned with legal rela-
tions and consequences. What could be more natural, then, than to use
words which "give the facts a legal coloring and aspect," and "present
them in a legal bearing"? If one sought to describe a situation having-
legal significance entirely in words which were devoid of all legal
evaluation the result would be a series of prolix circunlocutions
which would serve neither elegance of style nor ease of understand-
ing.75
No court has ever consistently insisted on any such rule and most
pleadings bristle with words which would fall under the literal pro-.
hibition set forth in. Pomeroy's passage. Very occasionally, however,-
73. POMEROY § 529, at 566.
74. Ibid.
75. See generally Cook, Statement6 of Fact in Pleading under the Codes, 21
COLUM. L. REv. 416 (1921); Cook, 'Facts' and 'Statements of--Fact,' 4 U. CHi. L.
REv. 233 (1937). See also CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 38 (2d ed. 1947).'
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a decision has apparently tried to squeeze out all words which involve
a legal evaluation of the facts. An extreme example is Kramer v.
Kansas City Power & Light Co.,76 in which plaintiff, employed by
defendant as a lineman, was injured when a spike or step used for
climbing a pole gave way under his weight. The complaint charged
"that defendant negligently caused said step to be driven and placed
in said pole not far enough to make it reasonably safe. . .. ,77 The
court held this to be nothing "but the statement of a legal conclusion."
The plaintiff should have alleged that the spike was driven in so as
to leave exposed in excess of 4% inches between the pole and the
inside of the flange of the step, and "charged defendant with
negligence in maintaining said step at a greater length than 4'/z
inches .... 78
Nothing in their report indicates that the framers of the original
code had any such idea as this in mind. Indeed the forms set out in
the appendix are very simple and direct and show no effort to avoid
words which present facts in their legal bearing. Thus the complaint
"on a covenant" alleges that "defendant executed ... an instrument";
that "for assault and battery" states that defendant "assaulted and
beat the plaintiff"; that for trespass to land, that defendant "wrong-
fully entered a lot of land, of which the plaintiff is owner..."; that
for libel that "defendant ... published the following libel.. .";79 and
so on. The italicized words certainly fall within the literal terms of
Pomeroy's strictures.
What this report does indicate is that the Commissioners disap-
proved of the many fictitious and false allegations of the common
law and the practice of pleading the facts according to their legal
effect when that did not correspond to the way laymen would
describe them. The common counts, especially that for money had and
received, came in for much criticism.80 And it was such fictitious
allegations that Pomeroy gave as examples of what he was condemn-
ing. Moreover, the same passage has words of tempered praise8l for
the declaration in an action on the special case which also employed
words containing legal evaluation, as that "defendant negligently
drove his carriage into and against plaintiff." The difference here is
that the word in question is neither false nor fictitious but would be
understood by a layman to be used in just the sense of its legal sig-
nificance. Perhaps, then, Pomeroy did not mean his words to be
76. 311 Mo. 369, 279 S.W. 43 (1925).
77. 311 Mo. at 383, 279 S.W. at 47.
78. Id. at 47.
79. FiRST REPORT OF ComnVnssIoxRS 266, 267. (Emphasis added.)
80. See note 46 supra.
81. PoMRoY § 529 at 566.
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taken literally, but if not they are unfortunately misleading. What-
ever Pomeroy's meaning may have been, it may be safely asserted
that the principles of code pleading do not forbid the use of words
containing legal evaluation when those words are fairly descriptive
of the facts in ordinary lay language, without resort to legal fictions
like the promise in general assumpsit.8
But the striking down of fictions does not exhaust the prohibition
against pleading law or legal effect. The statement that defendant is
legally liable to plaintiff for damages is in a certain sense a statement
of fact. It is certainly not the statement of a legal rule. It can be
made to fit into a syllogism as the minor premise. It is not satisfied by
the showing of any conceivable combination of evidentiary facts
because many such combinations will not entail legal liability, so this
allegation limits the scope of what may be proved under it. It amounts,
in other words, to a statement of the existence of one or more of those
combinations of subordinate facts which spell legal liability, not just
any facts. Yet the statement just given would not serve as a complaint
under the codes (nor as a common law declaration, for that matter).83
In order to get at the gist of the notion we are dealing with here,
let us take a series of statements, starting with the one just analyzed.
1. Defendant is legally liable to plaintiff for damages.
2. Defendant negligently caused plaintiff injury.
3. Defendant negligently caused plaintiff bodily injury through
the operation of a motor vehicle.
4. Defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff
who was then crossing [named] highway.
As a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg broken,
etc.
5. Same as # 4 with an added paragraph following the first, as
follows:
The defendant was negligent in that he failed to keep a proper
lookout, drove at excessive speed, etc.
6. Same as # 4 with an added paragraph following the first, as
follows:
The defendant was negligent in that he was looking at a passenger
in the back seat of his automobile and not in the direction in which
he was going; in that he was driving at a speed of 43 miles per
hour, etc.
82. See, e.g., Bank of Marshall County v. Boyd, 308 Ky. 742, 215 S.W.2d 850
(1948); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Wolfe, 80 Ky. 82 (1882); Clark v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. R.R., 28 Minn. 69, 9 N.W. 75 (1881); Omaha & R.V. R.R. v. Wright,
49 Neb. 456, 68 N.W. 618 (1896); CLAmK, CODE PLEADING § 38 (2d ed. 1947).
83. King v. Wilmington & N.C. Elec. R.R., 17 Del. (1 Pen.) 452, 41 Atl. 975
(Del. Super. 1898).
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It will be noted that what was said about the first statement is
true of all the others except that each of the following statements
will be satisfied by a progressively narrower, more limited, showing
of evidentiary facts. The second, for example, will not be satisfied
by any facts showing legal liability, but only by those entailing lia-
bility based on negligence. The last will not be satisfied by any
failure to keep a lookout or any speed, but only by evidence showing
a certain kind of failure of lookout and a speed of 43 miles per hour.
It will also be noted that all of the above statements describe facts
according to their legal effect and "present them in a legal bearing."
Only in the sixth is any attempt made (in the second paragraph) to
describe defendant's conduct in words which avoid legal evaluation.
To complete the picture it should be added that most courts would
hold that the first three forms of statement do not suffice; that the
allegations are mere conclusions of law.8 On the other hand, few if
any courts insist on the form of statement found in # 6; some would
even characterize it as an improper statement of evidence. All or vir-
tually all courts would accept the form of statement found in # 5.0
The form of statement found in # 4 is taken from the common law
declaration in an action on the case, is found in Form 9 of the forms
set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and would be held
by many courts to satisfy the code requirement which we are dealing
with here.
87
The proscription against pleading evidence is also concerned pri-
marily with questions of degree of detail. Here again an analytical
distinction of sorts is possible,8 but it is largely illusory and does not
cover the whole field of the prohibition which is in effect one against
undue prolixity.89 The rule against pleading evidence under the
codes is of less practical importance than the rule against pleading
legal conclusions. The latter are bad on demurrer and will be disre-
garded in determining the sufficiency of the complaint.9o Too much
detail on the other hand rarely will render the complaint vulnerable
84. Newell v. Woodward, 241 App. Div. 786, 270 N.Y. Supp. 258 (3d Dep't
1934); Pagnillo v. Mack Paving & Constr. Co., 142 App. Div. 491, 127 N.Y.
Supp. 72 (2d Dep't 1911).
85. Cf., e.g., Georgia S. & F. R.R. v. Williamson, 84 Ga. App. 167, 65 S.E.2d
444 (1951), wherein plaintiff complained of injury from falling on clinker,
coal, or other debris negligently allowed to remain in railroad yard. Defend-
ant by special demurrer attacked the complaint for vagueness in failing to
state exactly the kind of debris and its location. Demurrer overruled. "[T]he
pleader is not required to set out his evidence."
86. See, e.g., forms in CONN. PRACTICE BOOK 251-64 (1951); DEC. DIG., Plead-
ing at Key number 8 (17).
87. See cases cited supra note 82.
88. See POmEROY § 526.
89. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 38 (2d ed. 1947).
90. Didier v. Macfadden Publications, Inc., 299 N.Y. 49, 53, 85 N.E.2d 612
(1949); Bornhorst v. Lyon, 279 App. Div. 820, 109 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1952).
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to demurrer, though it may be stricken on appropriate motion, and is
rarely prejudicial to the pleader's adversary (by failing to give
adequate notice of what is to be proven).91 It may of course be the
case that the evidentiary facts pleaded fall short of showing, by
legitimate inference or otherwise, the existence of a necessary element
of the pleader's claim or defense. Where that is true the pleading may
be fatally defective.92
Of the foregoing, the following is the sum:
(1) The office of the code complaint is to state the facts of the specific
case and not a rule or rules of law.
(2) It is often said that the complaint should state facts, or ultimate
or issuable facts, but not conclusions of law, or evidence.
(3) This rule should not be read as forbidding the statement of facts
by words which gave them a legal coloring or "present them in a
legal bearing," except where the legal aspect is fictitious and fails to
correspond with a way in which laymen might describe the facts.
(4) This rule should mean only that a certain amount of detail or
specificity will be required. The distinction between law, facts, and
evidence is one of degree of generality on the one hand and detail on
the other. If the facts are given in enough detail, they may be stated
in, or characterized by, words which involve a legal conclusion.
(5) Nevertheless, this rule was sometimes taken literally and some
courts were induced to pursue the will-o'-the-wisp of a valid analytic
distinction between fact and legal conclusion.
(6) The prohibition against too general pleading (legal conclusions)
was in practice far more troublesome than the prohibition against
pleading too much detail.
The net result of all this was a good deal of confusion and difference
of opinion among the states9 3 and even within a single state.9 To the
extent that the distinction was simply one of degree, it invited a wide
range of decisions upon the precise degree of detail to be required;
and the invitation was accepted. Some courts permitted fairly broad
and simple allegations comparable to those in an action on the case
(and those set out above in # 3, page 915).95 This is probably what
91. CLARK, loc. cit. supra note 89.
92. DeCordova v. Sanville, 214 N.Y. 662, 108 N.E. 1092 (1915), reversing
165 App. Div. 128, 150 N.Y. Supp. 709 (1st Dep't 1914), on dissenting- opinion
of Ingraham, J.
See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 233 n.79 (2d ed. 1947).
93. CLARK, loc. cit. supra note 89. Compare note 95 with notes 98-100, infra.
94. Cf. CONN. PRACTICE BOOK 452 (1922) (form essentially like FED. R. Crv.
P. Form 9) with later editions omitting such form.- See Clark, Book Review,
44 YALE L.J. 1483 (1935); 9 CONN. B.J. 282 (1935).
95. Cases cited supra note 82.
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the framers of the original codes had in mind; witness the simple
forms prepared by the Commissioners9 (not made part of the act),
and the direction to use "ordinary and concise language."97 Other
courts, however, insisted on great detail98-even to the point described
in the Kramer case.99 And the situation was vexed by the fruitless
quest of an analytic distinction which would transcend differences in
degree.100 It is small wonder that leading critics have found this
aspect of fact pleading the least successful venture of the codes.101
The complaint under the federal rules.-When the federal rules were
drafted in the 1930's, the provision for the content of pleadings con-
tained neither the word "facts," nor the term "cause of action." It
provided instead that a claim for relief should contain "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."'1 2 The omissions were quite deliberate. Those who chose
the new language did not intend, however, to repudiate the original
objectives of code pleading, but rather in large part to restore them.103
The intention was to repudiate the gloss which some courts had put on
the omitted words and thereby to avoid the trouble which had
resulted from what were probably misconceptions of the original pur-
pose.lo4
The difficulties we are concerned with here came from attempts
to distinguish between "fact" and "legal conclusion," and from too
much insistence on detail in pleading, and both of these difficulties
96. See note 79 supra, and accompanying text.
97. FmST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS § 120 (2).
98. See, e.g., Overton v. Alford, 210 Ga. 780, 82 S.E.2d 836 (1954); Brown v.
Western Ry. of Ala., 77 Ga. App. 780, 49 S.E.2d 833, rev'd, 338 U.S. 294 (1949);
Langenberg v. City of St. Louis, 355 Mo. 634, 197 S.W.2d 621 (1946); Crenshaw
v. Crenshaw, 120 Mont. 190, 182 P.2d 477 (1947); Shives v. Sample, 238 N.C.
724, 79 S.E.2d 193 (1953).
99. Note 76 supra.
100. As in the Kramer case. See also the attempt to distinguish between an
allegation of undue influence (conclusion of law) and an allegation that
Cleary's acts "were not the natural result of the uncontrolled will of Cleary
but represent in fact that of defendant" (allegation of fact). Krug v. Meehan,
109 Cal. App. 2d 274, 240 P.2d 732 (1952).
101. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 226 (2d ed. 1947). See also 2 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE ff 8.12 (2d ed. 1960) and authorities cited in note 5 of ff 8.12.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2). This rule "was deliberately drafted to avoid
this terminology because of the gloss of technical decisions that have grown
up in New York and some other code states around the words 'facts' and
'cause of action."' Tolman, Advisory Committee's Proposals To Amend the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 40 A.B.A.J. 843, 844 (1954). The Committee
rejected a proposal to reintroduce the omitted language into the rule. ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PRO-
POSED AinTDmNTS 8-9 (1954). See also Wright, Amendments to the Federal
Rules: The Function of a Continuing Rules Committee, 7 VAND. L. REV. 521,
549-51 (1954); 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 0.528 (2d ed. 1959).
103. Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY EssAYs 3, 13, 14 (1949); Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today,
Id. at 55, particularly 64-67.
104. See Clark, op. cit. supra note 103; Tolman, op. cit. supra note 102.
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-were associated with the code provision for pleading "facts."
We have seen how a requirement of detail in pleading tends to
thwart the attainment of substantive justice. The federal rules added
-another reason for allowing general pleading.
The only justification for requiring detailed pleading (and thereby
aggravating the danger that the pleader will fail to get his just
desserts) is that detail gives the pleader's adversary and the court
better guidance for their conduct in the litigation. The adversary will
know better how to prepare, and the court how to rule, if they are
given a detailed blueprint of what to expect. The federal rules pro-
vide a better blueprint than the pleadings by affording extensive
-discovery devices and the chance for pretrial hearings. Discovery
allows each party to probe his adversary and witnesses for relevant
facts and evidence in a manner far more searching than even the
strictest pleading. Moreover, discovery yields information concerning
facts from witnesses who really know about them, whereas pleadings
are merely the paper statements and claims of the lawyers. 0 5 The
pretrial conference affords the judge a superior chance to find out the
parties' theories of action and defense.
Those who drafted the federal rules did not invent either discovery
-or the pretrial conference. Discovery has ancient roots and was a
-well-recognized procedure in equity long before the codes. And
equity provided devices for discovery and depositions in aid of an
action or defense at law. Those who framed the original codes found
an important role for discovery in the system they set up. The New
York Code of 1848 abolished the separate equitable bill of discovery
and substituted for it simplified procedures for obtaining discovery
by motions and depositions. The Commissioners found these pro-
visions to be "in harmony with the whole spirit of [their] design;
which is, to get at the facts in a legal controversy by the shortest pos-
sible way . . . ."106 But the codifiers overlooked the fact that sub-
stantive limitations on the equitable devices severly hampered their
usefulness for the purpose of getting at the facts of the controversy;
0 7
-while they did simplify the procedure, they failed to extend limits
upon what could be discovered. And these limitations continued to
curtail the usefulness of discovery in most, but not all, American
jurisdictions until the advent of the federal rules.'0 By abolishing
the most serious of these limitations, the rules gave the coup de grace
105. See statements of Judge Clark in AivnmaIcA BAR ASSOCIATION, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 44, 242, 245
(1939), quoted in James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars Under the Federal
Rules, 71 HAav. L. REV. 1473, 1474 n.9, 1479 n.32 (1958).
106. FIRST REPORT OF COmmISSIONERS 241.
107. See sources cited in notes 6, 7, 8 supra.
108. See Ragland, op. cit. supra note 8.
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to the last valid reason for requiring detailed pleading. 100
In short, then, the federal rules share with the codes some of the
most important pleading objectives. Both systems look to the com-
plaint to give the defendant and the court accurate factual notice.
Neither system seeks to tie the pleader down to a single legal theory.
Under both systems a plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of any legal
theory-the "whole law of the land"-applicable to the facts he has
alleged. The principle difference is the emphasis of the federal rules
on breadth and simplicity of the factual notice required. This is
probably not inconsistent with the purpose of the original codes. But
the emphasis is new and a new justification for broad pleading is pro-
vided by setting up broad discovery machinery and the pretrial
conference. This combination, it is hoped, will achieve a reasonable
balance between the claims of substantive justice and the need, in
a finite world under an adversary system, to give advance notice of
what will be litigated.
109. A pleader may find it to his advantage to use greater detail than the
rules require, as where he wishes to invite the determination before trial of
the legal sufficiency of his claim. The rules leave the pleader perfectly free
to do this. See, e.g., Dale Sys., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn.
1953); Dale Sys., Inc. v. General Teleradio, 105 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
where this was done.
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